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Expanding the Scope of Practice for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses: A
Legislative Call to Action
By A.J. Barbarito*
Part I: Introduction
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses (APRNs) are skilled clinicians, whose expertise
could aid immensely in the expansion and affordability of health care in the United States.
Unfortunately, their practice is often hobbled by cumbersome collaborative agreements with
physicians. A 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on the future of nursing recommended inter
alia that "[n]urses should practice to the full extent of their education and training."1 This would
entail uncoupling APRNs from physician oversight of their practice, as current regulation in most
states mandates that APRNs must operate to some extent in collaboration with, and accountable
to, a supervising physician.
While many states currently have legislation in place—or pending—granting APRNs the
right to practice to the extent of their training, the expansion of APRN roles in the care of patients
is not without controversy.2 The IOM report received backlash from physician groups, including
the American Medical Association, who urged that such expansion would not improve quality of
care, ostensibly because nurses do not receive the level of training that physicians receive.3
However, such concerns are almost entirely unsupported by empirical studies. Moreover, this
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1
NST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH S-4 (2011) [hereinafter IOM
FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], available at
http://www.thefutureofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20Nursing%20Report_0.pdf.
2
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS 2-3
http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
3
Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Responds to IOM Report on Future of Nursing (Oct. 5, 2010)
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/nursing-future-workforce.page.
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interference from physicians, in the face of ample evidence that APRNs supply care that is at least
favorably comparable to that of physicians, calls into question whether physicians have patients’
best interests in mind, or whether their attitudes and actions are in fact anti-competitive. The
question then becomes whether physicians’ opposition puts them at risk of antitrust liability.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part II introduces the reader to APRNs, including their
training, education and practice, and the data available on their competency as healthcare
practitioners. It also discusses the clinician shortages and expanded Medicaid and insurance
coverage that leads to the necessity of expanded access to health care.
Part III discusses the current legislative scheme that regulates the scope of practice for
APRNs. It then explores the Institute of Medicine’s report, and efforts from various agencies
advocating the expanded scope of practice for APRNs. This Note calls upon current legislatures,
especially New Jersey’s, to amend laws governing the practice of nursing to expand their scope of
practice.
Part IV discusses physician opposition to this legislative action, and opines that this is
motivated by anticompetitive rather than patient care concerns; this section suggests possible
remedies, concluding with the proposition that while antitrust actions may provide some limited
remedies for isolated cases of blatant anti-competitive behavior, the issue must ultimately be
resolved by state legislatures.4
Part II: APRN Background and Regulation
A: Introduction to APRN

4

This Note does not argue or advocate for expanded scope of practice for any professions aside from that of
APRNs. While I acknowledge that certain other practitioners, including chiropractors, naturopaths, and various
others argue for expanded scope of practice rights, these professions are starkly distinct from APRNs, and their
arguments for expanded scope of practice are not meant to be supported by the research found in this Note, nor does
this Note recognize such as “medical” practitioners.
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“APRN” is a specific category of nursing professional as defined by most state practice
laws.5 An APRN is a medical professional with an advanced nursing (post-graduate) degree in one
of four specialties: certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA), certified nurse-midwife (CNM),
clinical nurse specialist (CNS), and certified nurse practitioner (CNP).6 Each of these healthcare
practitioner categories specialize in the care of at least one population, including family/individual
across the lifespan, adult-gerontology, pediatrics, neonatal, women’s health/gender-related, or
psych/mental health.7 There has been some discussion regarding whether APRNs should complete
a residency program for clinical training, and there currently exist several such programs
throughout the US.8 Many institutions conferring APRN degrees carry a credit load which, in other
health care degree programs, would be equivalent to a doctoral degree.9
Each APRN specialist is trained in a specific area of health care. The CRNA is trained to
provide anesthesia for a diverse spectrum of patients in diverse locations.10 He or she will
administer anesthesia to both healthy and severely ill patients, for a wide variety of procedures, in
settings that include “hospital surgical suites and obstetrical delivery rooms; critical access

5

Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal Competition Policy and the Scope
of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 145 (2014).
6
APRN Consensus Work Grp., Consensus Model for APRN Regulation: Licensure, Accreditation, Certification &
Education 5 (Nat'l Council of State Boards of Nursing 2008) [hereinafter NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL],
https://www.ncsbn.org/Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
7
Id., at 6.
8
Kate Darby Rauch, Are Residencies the Future of Nurse Practitioner Training?, SCIENCE OF CARING (Jan., 2013),
http://scienceofcaring.ucsf.edu/future-nursing/are-residencies-future-nurse-practitionertraining#sthash.mROjZli6.dpuf.
9
Am. of Colleges of Nursing, The Doctor of Nursing Practice (2013), http://www.aacn.nche.edu/mediarelations/fact-sheets/DNPFactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); The subjects of whether the Doctor of Nursing
Practice (DNP) degree should be a prerequisite to APRN status, and the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign
focusing on allegedly misleading applications of the DNP degree are not addressed in this Note.
10
See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8.
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hospitals; acute care; pain management centers; ambulatory surgical centers; and the offices of
dentists, podiatrists, ophthalmologists, and plastic surgeons.”11
The CNM provides a wide variety of care to women, “including gynecologic care, family
planning services, preconception care, prenatal and postpartum care, childbirth, and care of the
newborn.”12 Their patients occasionally include the male partners of their female patients, for
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and reproductive health.13 The CNM practices in many
settings, including “home, hospital, birth center, and a variety of ambulatory care settings including
private offices and community and public health clinics.”14
The CNS “is responsible and accountable for diagnosis and treatment of health/illness
states, disease management, health promotion, and prevention of illness and risk behaviors among
individuals, families, groups, and communities,” integrating care between and among the three
spheres of influence: patient, nurse, and system.15 His or her primary goal is to improve patient
outcomes and the quality of nursing care, and while the CNS has traditionally worked in hospitals,
the role is expanding into nursing homes, schools, home care, and hospice.16 The CNS role has
historically experienced ambiguity, such that they have assumed many roles, including “staff and
patient educator, consultant, supervisor, project director, and more recently, case manager.”17 The
CNS concept was developed in World War II, when the need emerged to have highly qualified
nurses involved in patient care.18

11

Id.; see also American Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists, Qualifications and Capabilities of the Certified Registered
Nurse Anesthetist, http://www.aana.com/ceandeducation/becomeacrna/Pages/Qualifications-and-Capabilities-of-theCertified-Registered-Nurse-Anesthetist-.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
12
See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id., at 8-9.
16
Id.
17
Michalene Jansen et al., Advanced Practice Nursing 21 (3rd ed. Springer Publ'g 2009).
18
Id., at 20.
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NPs are perhaps the most recognizable of the four APRN roles, and they are especially
ubiquitous in their areas of specialty. NPs “diagnose; develop differential diagnoses; order,
conduct, supervise, and interpret diagnostic and laboratory tests; and prescribe pharmacologic and
nonpharmacologic treatments in the direct management of acute and chronic illness and disease,”
and they perform all of these roles across virtually every medical specialty and subspecialty.19 NPs
may practice autonomously or in collaboration with other healthcare professionals.20
B: APRN Training
Regarding the sufficiency of APRN education and training, the American Association of
Nurse Practitioners (AANP) highlights the fact that nursing students start their formal healthcare
education before entering graduate school (as opposed to physicians, who begin such training in
medical school), and this training includes “physical assessment skills, interpreting diagnostic test
results, [and] evaluating the appropriateness of medications and patients’ responses to treatments
in both hospital and community settings.”21 The AANP observes further that nursing education is
based upon competency, rather than time, and quotes a physician from the American Academy of
Family Physicians (AAFP)—an organization that actively opposes scope of practice
reformation—criticizing the current method in medical education of using time, rather than
competency, as the yardstick for measuring successful education.22

Id., at 16; What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/all-aboutnps/what-is-an-np.
20
What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/all-about-nps/whatis-an-np.
21
Clinical Outcomes: The Yardstick of Educational Effectiveness, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15,
2015), http://www.aanp.org/images/documents/publications/clinicaloutcomesyardstick.pdf.
22
Id., (“Both in medical student education and residency, we have clung to the belief that if you spend a certain
amount of time learning about something, then you must know it,” he told AAFP News Now. “That’s as ridiculous
as thinking that a teenager should be given a (driver’s) license just because he or she spent a set number of hours
behind the wheel of a car”); see also Anna-Lena Nieminen, Bodil Mannevaara & Lisbeth Fagerström, Advanced
Practice Nurses' Scope of Practice: A Qualitative Study of Advanced Clinical Competencies, 25 Scandinavian J. of
Caring Sci. 662, 661-670 (2011) (many researchers relate RNs’ clinical competence to the nurse-patient relationship
while relating the quality of nursing care to a population’s health needs []. The description of clinical competence
varies from tasks to be done to a holistic view that includes knowledge, skills, ability, and ethical conduct []. Several
19

6

C: APRN Regulation
In many states, APRNs are restricted by local regulatory schemes that prevent them from
practicing to the full extent of their education. Specifically, “Scope of Practice”, a term used with
all licensed health practitioners, describes “the rules, the regulations, and the boundaries within
which a fully qualified practitioner with substantial and appropriate training, knowledge, and
experience may practice in a field of medicine or surgery, or other specifically defined field.”23
Under the current regulatory scheme of most states, even though APRNs receive training that
qualifies them to practice in areas beyond these limits, they are either entirely denied the right to
do so, or must work under restrictive collaborative agreements, wherein they ostensibly are
supervised by a physician.24 As will be demonstrated in this Note, these regulatory schemes have
nothing to do with empirical evidence regarding patient outcomes, competency, or malpractice
concerns; rather, they are simply an outgrowth of unsubstantiated and misleading claims by
physicians’ groups that the traditional patriarchal system of physician-led healthcare teams must
be preserved.

1- Expanding Scope of Practice - Access

researchers emphasize that both practical and theoretical knowledge are part of professional clinical competence [].
Clinical competence is based on a nurse’s ability to integrate nursing science and other sciences into his/her clinical
competence []. The practical knowledge in clinical nursing care is also formed through role models []. An RN’s
clinical competence consists of his/her personal ability and capability in implementing knowledge in different
nursing contexts and situations in cooperation with others).
23

FED'N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, ASSESSING SCOPE OF PRACTICE IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: CRITICAL
QUESTIONS IN ASSURING PUBLIC ACCESS AND SAFETY (2005),
http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/2005_grpol_scope_of_practice.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
24
AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, GUIDELINES ON THE SUPERVISION OF CERTIFIED NURSE MIDWIVES, NURSE
PRACTITIONERS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2008),
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/news/NP_Info_GlinesNP-060710.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015);
Joanne Pohl et al., The Latest Data On Primary Care Nurse Practitioners And Physicians: Can We Afford To Waste
Our Workforce?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jun. 18 2013) (“More than half the states require physician supervision or
collaboration for an NP to practice, despite the lack of any data to support the need for such a regulation”).
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The current impetus for APRN scope of practice expansion is the gap in access to quality
medical care, especially primary care. The number of physicians entering into primary care or
internal medicine is steadily decreasing, while the number of nurse practitioners (NPs) is
increasing.25 The AMA has cited experts predicting a shortage of more than 45,000 primary care
physicians by 2020.26 This shortage is attributed to several factors, including increased demand
for healthcare brought on by the aging of the “baby boomer” generation as well as the influx of
newly insured Affordable Care Act beneficiaries, and decreased supply, resulting from a large
class of primary care physicians retiring (also baby boomers), and decreased interest from medical
students in primary care, largely due to its low reimbursement rates.27 While there is disagreement
over the extent of the shortage, experts agree that poor urban and rural areas are most affected.28
APRNs, if un-tethered from supervising physicians, would be able to expand into rural areas that
physicians eschew.29 Currently, 18% of NPs practice in such rural areas, while CNMs attend a
“substantial portion of births” and CRNAs are the sole anesthesia providers in 85% of those rural
areas.30 This is possible because in many of these rural states, scope of practice for APRNs has
already been expanded to allow either a more liberal collaborative agreement, or have altogether
disbursed with collaborative agreements, allowing full scope of practice.31

25

Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Reinventing Primary Care, 24 Health
Aff. 893, 893-894 (2010).
26
Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Urges Continued Support for Adequate Graduate Medical
Education Funding to Meet Future Physician Workforce Needs (July 29, 2014) available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-07-29-support-graduate-medical-education-funding.page.
27
Mark D. Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Primary Care Workforce Bottleneck, 27 J. of Gen. Internal
Med. 469, 469-472 (2012); Stephen C. Schimpff, Why is there a shortage of primary care physicians?,
KEVINMD.COM (Feb. 17, 2014) http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/shortage-primary-care-physicians.html.
28
The Editorial Bd., Bottlenecks in Training Doctors, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2014 at ,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/opinion/sunday/bottlenecks-in-training-doctors.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar.
16, 2015).
29
Sylvia Smith, Nurse Practitioners Fill the Gap, AARP THE MAGAZINE, AARP.ORG, (AUG.-SEPT., 2014),
http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/nurse-practitioners-fill-the-gap.html.
30
Kelly A. Goudreau et al., Health Policy and Advanced Practice Nursing 33 (Springer Publ'g 2013).
31
See discussion, Part III, infra.
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2 – Economic Benefits
The other impetus for legislation is the possible economic benefits of expanded scope,
though even the IOM report concedes that an analysis of those benefits is problematic.32 However,
one study in 2009 projected that Massachusetts (which at the time was the only state to have passed
sweeping health care legislation) could save $4.2 to $8.4 billion on health care between 2010-2020
by expanding scope of practice for NPs.33 That study further proposed that encouraging use of
CNMs for low-risk pregnancies and CRNAs for certain surgeries could similarly reduce costs.34
Linked to this finding is the proposal, in the same report, that promotion of “retail clinics”; i.e.,
clinics found in retail shopping centers and drug stores, could save the State $6 billion between
2010-2020.35 The link stems from the fact that generally, NPs are the ones who staff such clinics,
and they would need full prescriptive abilities to convey the benefits.36 It should be noted, however,
that the economic motive is secondary to the overall goal of promoting access to and quality of
care, and since part of the agenda for APRNs is to achieve parity of reimbursement with physicians
for equal service, the economic benefit could ultimately prove negligible.37

Part III: Legislating Scope of Practice Barriers
A: Federal Legislation

32

IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra at 1-8.
Christine E. Eibner et al, Controlling Health Care Spending in Massachusetts: An Analysis of Options,103-104
(Rand 2009).
34
Id., at 108.
35
Id., at 87.
36
Id., at 85.
37
Patricia L. Starck, The Cost of Doing Business in Nursing Education, 21 J. of Prof. Nursing 183, 185 (2005); IOM
FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT at S-8.
33
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The IOM report makes separate recommendations for federal and state legislative action.
Regarding federal action, it recommends: (1) Expanding Medicare to cover APRN services
currently allowed under state law, as PCPs are covered, and at the same rates; (2) Amending
Medicare to authorize certain APRN admitting privileges and certifications; (3) Extending the
ACA Medicaid reimbursement increases for primary care physicians to cover APRN services; (4)
Limiting federal funding for nursing programs only to states that have adopted the National
Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) advanced practice registered nurse model rules and
regulations.38
1: Expanding Medicare
Current Medicare Conditions of Participation enable CRNAs and CNMs to perform
services without a collaboration agreement with physicians in order to be reimbursed, though
neither will necessarily receive reimbursement equal to that of a physician performing the same
procedure.39 By contrast the Conditions of Participation require that an NP or a CNS must work in
collaboration with a physician, despite the existence of a more permissive state scope of practice
scheme.40 Medicare reimburses the NP or CNS up to 85% of what a physician would earn for the
same service.41 The committee advising Congress on the matter has not provided an analytical
justification for the difference in reimbursement rates.42 Since insurance companies take their cues

38

Id.; APRN Joint Dialogue Group Report, July 7, 2008 at 7; Robert Pear, As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in
Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/us/obamacare-medicaid-fee-increases-expiring.html?_r=2 (last visited Mar. 17,
2015)(the increased reimbursement expired on December 31, 2014).
39
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE INFORMATION
FOR ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES, ANESTHESIOLOGIST ASSISTANTS, AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS
(2011).
40
At-a-Glance Billing Guidelines, TEX. MED. ASS’N., http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=2273 (last visited
Mar. 17, 2015).
41
Id.
42
Amanda Cassidy, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=79. (“The Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, the federal agency that advises Congress on Medicare issues, found that there was no analytical
foundation for this difference.”).
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from Medicare regarding reimbursement rates for APRN services, an increase in the Medicare
reimbursement rate could therefore affect the insurance reimbursement rate.43
2: Amending Medicare
The goal to amend Medicare was introduced because, as it is currently written, Medicare
will only allow a physician (not an APRN) to certify patients for, inter alia, home health and
hospice care.44 This kind of care allows Medicare recipients to receive certain personal care
services—including end of life and palliative care—at home, rather than in an extended-stay
hospital or nursing home.45 Approximately 33% of Medicare beneficiaries experienced some kind
of adverse effect as a result of a stay at a skilled nursing home.46 Furthermore, the vast majority of
seniors favor granting more access for the elderly and infirm to at-home care.47 Giving APRNs the
ability to certify this type of care would improve access and expediency for this service. 48 Again,
though, Congress has failed to act in this regard.

3: Reimbursement

43

Lorraine Bock, Changing Reimbursement Policies, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK FOR NPS AND PAS,
http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb.com/Article/Changing-Reimbursement-Policies.aspx
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also 42 USCS § 1395b-6 (LEXIS 2015)(establishing the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, which advises Congress on payment policies under Medicare).
44
42 USCS § 1395f (LEXIS 2015); see also http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/27/howobamacare-is-ramping-up-a-health-care-turf-war/.
45
Andrea Brassard, Removing Barriers to Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Care: Home Health and Hospice
Services, 66 INSIGHT ON THE ISSUES 1, 2 (Jul. 2012) available at
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/health/removing-barriers-advanced-practiceregistered-nurse-home-health-hospice-insight-july-2012-AARP-ppi-health.pdf.
46
Adverse Events in Skilled Nursing Facilities: National Incidence Among Medicare Beneficiaries, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 1, 17-22 (2014),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-11-00370.pdf.
47
Brassard, supra note 45, at 4.
48
Id.
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The third IOM recommendation called for extending to APRNs the ACA reimbursement
for primary care physicians. The provision in question increased mandatory Medicaid rates paid
to certain primary care physicians to equal the rates paid by Medicare for the same services.49 This
provision expired in 2014, however, after an extension failed to escape committee in the
Republican-controlled Congress.50 This recommendation was essentially no different from other
reimbursement equity provisions envisioned by the Report, except that its acceptance could have
theoretically increased health care access into underserved areas. Many of the underserved receive
their health care from Medicaid-funded community health centers.51 Those health centers
receiving the benefit of Medicaid expansion granted by the ACA saw an increase in staff in all
areas except NPs, even though NPs account for a large portion of the providers in such facilities.52
Additionally, given the ACA’s use of the word “clinicians” rather than “physicians” in
much of its language, there seems to be a presumption in favor of diversified healthcare
practitioners.53 Furthermore, the provision for Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
(CMMI) have presumably left the door open for the inclusion of APRNs in future projects, once
the second round of funding for those projects comes around.54
4: Limiting Federal Funding to Consensus Model States

49

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID PROGRAM;
PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES FURNISHED BY CERTAIN PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS AND CHARGES FOR VACCINE
ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE VACCINES FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM 1, 3 (2009),
http://www.beckersasc.com/docs/oldmedia/CMSFinalRulePCPMedicaid.pdf.
50
Pear, supra note 38.
51
THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AND PRIMARY CARE CAPACITY IN MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED
COMMUNITIES 1, 2 (KAISER 2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8293.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Jansen, supra note 17, at 90.
54
Id., The CMMI is program within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created by the ACA,
which allows more freedom for CMS to experiment with new and innovative approaches to healthcare. Innovations
provided for in the legislation include, inter alia, insurance exchanges for those not covered by government or third
party insurance programs, a Medicare accountable care organization pilot program, and a program to provide
funding for the transitional care of patients being discharged from hospitals. The funding for these programs is not
necessarily limited to only physicians.
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The fourth recommendation—limiting federal funding [for what] to those states that have
adopted the NCBSN Consensus Model—is arguably the most effective tool to wrangle the States
into uniformity on the issue of APRN scope of practice.
a: The Consensus Model
The Consensus Model is the product of approximately 4 years of discussion between 23
nursing organizations and the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN).55 The
NCBSN is an independent, not-for-profit association through which state boards of nursing act to
standardize certain practices affecting nursing professions.56 The NCBSN coalesced with these
other nursing organizations to form the consensus model in order to rein in the chaotic nature of
APRN regulation and implement a stable and systematic expression of the designation, finally
bringing together a coherent system that covers licensure, accreditation, certification, and
education (LACE).57 The Model Act (for the practice of nursing) and Model Rules emerged from
this effort.58 As states implement the consensus model, state regulation nationwide will move
closer to uniformity in scope of practice regulation.59 Withholding federal funding for nursing
education from those states that do not conform to the consensus model could be a very effective
stick in creating state consensus; however, there is no sign at all of congressional action in this
area.

5: Spurring Action

55

Id., at 57.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
57
Jansen, supra note 17, at 59.
58
NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.
59
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/5397.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015)
(map showing the current landscape of implementation).
56
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This leads to the question of what exactly is needed to spur Congressional action to meet
the IOM goals. Health care is currently a huge source of contention in Congress, but nursing itself
can be a bi-partisan issue. A brief overview of the regions allowing expansive scope of practice
compared with stricter jurisdictions shows, that while the traditionally “red” southeast region is en
masse the most restrictive region, traditionally “blue” stronghold states like New York, New
Jersey, and California are also restrictive.60 On the other hand, the Southeast (besides California)
and the Northwest grant the most uniformly expansive scope of practice rights. 61 The inference,
given the demographics, is that the more rural states of the country (again, discounting the
Southeast) are the most open to expansive scope of practice. It would be preposterous to propose
that APRNs are simply more qualified to deliver medical care in rural areas than in urban ones;
therefore, the only deciding factor seems to be that more populous states have some reason other
than medical skill to limit APRN scope of nursing. The implication is antitrust, which will be
discussed infra. In the meantime, the implication for Congressional action is that the matter is of
bipartisan concern, and could probably be addressed without major partisan rancor, given enough
interest. Perhaps it could even be addressed in legislation amending the ACA. Of course, the great
disparity between the amounts of lobbying money contributed by the American Nurses
Association ($1,467,064 in 2014) versus the amount contributed by the AMA ($19,650,000 in
2014) may help to explain the reluctance of Congress to address the issue.62

60

BARTON ASSOCIATES, http://www.bartonassociates.com/nurse-practitioners/nurse-practitioner-scope-of-practicelaws/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (interactive graphic representing various scope of practice laws in U.S.).
61
Id.
62
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=D000000173 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2015); Id., at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000068 (last visited Mar. 19,
2015).
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B: Recommendations for the States
The IOM report recommends that state legislatures (1) Reform scope of practice
regulations to conform to the NCBSM model Act and Rules; and (2) “Require third-party payers
that participate in fee-for-service payment arrangements to provide direct reimbursement to
[APRNs] who are practicing within their scope of practice under state law.”63 This means that
private insurance companies would have to reimburse APRNs directly for specific services if those
services fall within a state’s scope of practice for APRNs, rather than requiring a collaborative
agreement with a physician.
1: Reforming Scope of Practice Laws
a: Collaborative Agreements
A collaborative agreement is a metaphorical tether, binding APRNs to a supervising
physician.64 A typical collaborative agreement, such as the kind required in New Jersey, require
the APRN and physician to establish joint protocols for the treatment of patients, and the
immediate presence or electronic availability of the collaborating physician.65 The more onerous
of such statutes requiring agreements, like Missouri’s contain stringent geographic proximity
requirements and bi-monthly review of patient charts.66 The main issue with such agreements is
that they potentially limit the services for and area in which an APRN can provide care, thus
limiting consumers’ access, and limiting the APRN unnecessarily from full use of his or her
training.67
b: Regulatory Structure

63

IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra at S-8.
CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS, ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED
NURSES 1, 2, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf.
65
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:11-49 (LEXIS 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:35-6.6 (LEXIS 2015) (regulates the standards
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State statutes, along with regulations promulgated by state nursing boards, regulate nursing
practice and scope.68 In addition, states have medical practice acts that may affect nursing scope
of practice by prohibiting the practice of medicine by all but medical doctors.69 These can lead to
murky territory, in which the exact scope of practice for APRNs is not fully delineated. 70 It is
therefore the province of state legislatures to enact reforms to scope of practice laws.
Consequently, it is in state legislatures where most of the battles are fought. The ultimate goal of
such legislation is to achieve full scope of practice for APRNs, including prescriptive privileges,
independent of collaborative agreements.71
c: The Consensus Model for State Regulation
The NCBSN tracks how compliant the states are with the Consensus Model.72 There are
11 states and 1 territory with a perfect NCSBN score for compliance.73 Iowa practically achieved
a perfect score, since the only requirement not met is the actual “APRN” title (Iowa’s designation
is “Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner” or “ARNP).74 However, the moniker “APRN” has
some legal significance for those practitioners who work across state lines.75 A perfect score means
that the state/territory has adopted all 4 APRN titles and roles (CNP, CRNA, CNM, CNS, though
some names may vary superficially), licensing, education, and certification requirements, and
perhaps most relevant to the immediate discussion, allows independent practice and independent
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prescribing without written collaboration agreements.76 A poor score means that the state has not
adopted the nomenclature, and does not allow independent practice. Among the lowest scoring
states are New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, and Alabama.77 In between are states that, inter alia,
allow independent practice but not independent prescriptive rights (Wisconsin), or fully meet all
licensing and title specifications but allow no independence (Texas), or give expanded rights to
some APRNs, but not others (North Carolina).78
i: New Jersey Scope of Practice Reform
New Jersey’s main sponsor of a bill eliminating collaborative agreements cites to a rural
New Jersey APRN who was the primary provider for “thousands of patients,” who had to stop
providing care when her supervising physician retired.79 Introduced in 2012 by Assemblywoman
Munoz, the New Jersey Consumer Access to Healthcare Act would bring sweeping change to New
Jersey scope of practice for APRNs.80 Specifically, it would entirely eliminate the need for any
collaborative agreement between any APRN (all roles) and a physician, and it would also allow
full prescriptive privileges for qualifying APRNs.81 This would bring New Jersey up to almost
complete compliance with the Model Rules; the only non-compliant portion is that the proposed
act continues to refer to the subject as Advanced Practice Nurses (APN), rather than APRN.82
The Executive Committee of the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners opposed the
Senate version of the Bill, expressing its opposition based upon 3 main concerns: that under certain
circumstances a physician should be brought in to give treatment, and the Bill erodes those
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circumstances; that the Bill could result in raised medical malpractice insurance premiums for
physicians; and that consumers should be advised as to who (actual role of the practitioner and her
education and title) is actually providing health care.83 As to the first complaint, there is no rational
explanation as to why a physician could not be brought in if needed, even under the new language
of the Act.84 The Act does not command APRNs to never contact a physician; it simply seeks to
expand the scope of practice to the extent of training. It should also be noted that even physicians
have a duty to refer patients whose care exceeds their competence, and face malpractice suits if
they fail in that duty; there is therefore no reason that APRNs should not face the same liability.85
Regarding the second objection, there does not appear to be evidence that relaxed licensing
laws cause malpractice premiums to increase. According to the National Bureau of Economic
Research, for example, while restrictive scope of practice laws tend to lead to greater health care
costs, more liberal laws lead to no change in malpractice premiums.86 Other sources show similar
results.87 However, this is an evolving area of the law, and its scope cannot be covered in this Note.
As to the objection that the public would not be adequately advised as to who provides
their health care, that objection essentially tracks the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign.88
That campaign ostensibly seeks to keep health care consumers informed about who is providing
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their health care, but could effectively work to punish nurses who may legitimately lay claim to
the title “Doctor,” such as APRNs who also have achieved a doctorate degree. 89 While patients
have a legitimate concern in knowing their provider’s qualifications, the proposed legislation in
that campaign is largely duplicative of current state legislation which already protects patients
from fraudulent representation of credentials, and it seeks to treat clinicians unequally, applying
standards to nurses that are not applied to physicians.90
ii: Other States’ Efforts
The continuing objections in other states echo the same themes as New Jersey. The
Michigan State Medical Society calls its state scope of nursing practice proposal “unproven and
controversial.”91 While it is controversial (because medical societies keep objecting to it), it is
obviously not unproven, given the breadth of similar laws already enacted.92 Florida’s bill
proposing expansion allows APRNs (in Florida, ARNPs) to practice independently, and to
prescribe controlled substances and narcotics, leading the Florida Medical Association to insinuate
Florida would “move backwards” in its fight to curb prescription medicine abuse.93 The
Association cited no study supporting the insinuation that expansion would lead to prescription
drug abuse, nor is the contention supported elsewhere.94 That bill subsequently died in
committee.95 The Massachusetts Medical Society also toes the line set by the AMA, “arguing
[expanded scope of practice] was contrary to an optimal physician-led, team-based health care
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delivery model and was a possible threat to patient safety.”96 Once again, no referral is made to
any study revealing a possible threat.97
The point is that while legislation on the issue is active in many states, states’ medical
societies oppose expanded scope of practice.98 And most of those medical societies have
significant lobbying influence.99 Consequently, much of the scope of practice legislation on the
slate for 2014 died, either in committee, or was voted down, or vetoed.100 Expanded scope of
practice is getting heard in the states, but the opposition, coming almost solely from physicians’
groups, is as fierce as it is unfounded in science.
d: An Emerging Strategy
Perhaps the best strategy for APRN advocates, though, is a piecemeal strategy. The laws
getting struck down are largely laws that propose sweeping legislation that immediately conforms
to the Model Act.101 In addition to his statement about conferring with his chief medical officer,
the Nebraska Governor spoke of his willingness to enact smaller changes.102 What may find
success is tying independence to some sort of clinical experience regime, perhaps which will
eventually be understood as a residency or equivalent. For example, as previously stated,
successful scope of practice expansion has been achieved when the legislation requires nurses to
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have a certain threshold of clinical experience within a collaborative agreement scheme before
they may be un-tethered, and strike out on their own.103 It has been observed that law passage is
biased in some states toward incremental, rather than comprehensive change, and adding mandated
hours of clinical experience may be the middle ground that ushers in more successful legislation.104
2: Reimbursement from 3rd Party Payers
Finally, the IOM report recommends that states require 3rd party payers to pay direct
reimbursement to APRNs.105 This provision was added because “few if any third-party payers
recognize nursing services that aren't bundled with medical management and, therefore, nursing
services are not directly reimbursed.”106 In short, nurses can’t get paid unless a physician who does
the billing on their behalf is supervising them.

As such, APRNs received reimbursement

“indirectly, incident to physicians, and at a considerably lower rate.”107 Such reimbursement
schemes create a de facto tether to physicians. Independence issues aside, the outcomes for patients
tend to improve with intervention from nurses, and without an accounting mechanism for nurse
intervention that direct reimbursement could supply, valuable care may be lost.108
Private third party insurers are regulated by the individual states.109 Federal mandates that
typically govern third party reimbursement in the realm of Medicare and Medicaid are often
blocked by discriminatory rules and regulations regarding “non-physician” and “mid-level”
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providers.110 Thus, there is an arbitrary reimbursement system in place which discriminates against
APRNs, without regard for patient outcomes. Of course, this proposition calls forth the
philosophical question of whether providers are paid for the quality of their outcomes, or the
quality, quantity and cost of their educations; to wit: should a physician receive more
reimbursement for her treatment of strep throat than a nurse practitioner for the exact same
treatment, because the physician presumably has the greater education? Under a fee-for-service
regime, does supposed expertise have a bearing on outcomes? Regardless of these more esoteric
considerations, the point of the IOM recommendation is, presumably, to pay people directly for
the health care they actually can provide, rather than filter that payment through unnecessary
middlemen.
Part IV: Physician Opposition and Antitrust
A: Physician Opposition
The main opposition to expanded scope of practice comes from contentions by physicians
that APRNs do not receive adequate training to be entrusted with the full scope of that training.
The AMA listed the disparity in clinical experience between doctors and nurses as its main
opposition to the IOM report.111 In 2014, New York State passed legislation expanding practice
for registered nurse practitioners.112 One vocal opponent of that legislation cited the AMA
verbatim in his scathing criticism of the new law.113 He further cited to a 1999 study suggesting
that NPs may resort to more diagnostic tests, thus negating any economic benefits.114 However, no
opposing party has actually cited to any research supporting the contention that APRNs provide
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inferior care; in fact, studies tend to show the opposite. Specifically, a systematic review compiling
nearly two decades of research found that “care delivered by APRNs and care delivered by
physicians (alone or in teams without an APRN) produce equivalent patient outcomes.”115 Of
course, this study focuses on the kinds of patients whom APRNs and physicians are qualified to
treat in common; there are many high risk or severely compromised patients whom APRNs do not
treat.
1: The Objective Evidence
The 2011 study, a meta-analysis examining 29 separate patient outcomes (as opposed to
patient preferences) from a total of 69 studies conducted over 18 years, demonstrated that in no
category did patients experience more adverse outcomes under the care of APRNs than under that
of physicians.116 In fact, APRNs’ patients presented more favorable outcomes in certain
categories.117 In a 2012 report critical of expanded scope of practice legislation, the Physicians
Foundation—whose mission is to oppose expansion of non-physicians’ scope of practice—
acknowledged that “the research literature shows, without exception, that within their areas of
training and experience, nurse practitioners provide care that is as good as or better than that
provided by physicians.”118 The report goes on to question the validity of one of those studies,
which it claims—without substantiation—is the definitive study on the topic, and fails to even
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mention the above 2011 study.119 The report suggests bias, observing without more that APRN
advocates performed much of the research in the area.120
The conflict of interest criticism asserted by the Physicians Foundation is ultimately
disingenuous. A 1986 policy analysis submitted to Congress by the now-defunct Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) found that “the weight of the evidence indicates that, within their
areas of competence, NPs… and CNMs provide care whose quality is equivalent to that of care
provided by physicians.”121 The OTA was committed to providing objective and non-partisan
information to Congress; it was not prone to a pro-APRN bias.122 While that report is nearly 30
years old, no physicians’ groups have put forward subsequent research to refute it, and it has been
substantially upheld by subsequent studies. While at the end of the day this report does not include
the most recent areas of practice, taken with the 2011 study, and the acknowledgement of the
Physicians Foundation that all empirical evidence points inexorably to the fact of equivalent
patient outcomes, and lacking any evidence to the contrary, physicians appear to base their
opposition not upon an objective scientific standard, but merely upon their own unsubstantiated
prejudices. Of course, it is quite possible that physicians view expanded scope of practice as a
competitive threat to their business; if that is the case, then the issue demands antitrust analysis.
B: Antitrust
Antitrust, for our purposes, is about the competitive effects of certain types of conduct that
potentially, adversely affect the price, quality, and availability of a product—in this case health
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care—thereby impinging upon the welfare of consumers.123 Physicians and APRNs are
competitors, not because they offer the exact same services to the same populations, but because
their services are potential substitutes.124 This is not to say that APRNs should replace physicians,
nor that the competitors should not also collaborate, or even work for each other.125 The purpose
of this Note is certainly not to ignore any issues of public safety. Rather, all other factors being
equal, this antitrust analysis seeks to expose harm to the consumer resulting from anticompetitive
behavior which, but for under-rationalized or arbitrary regulations put in place by one interested
competitor and sanctioned by governments, would not occur.
The IOM report speaks directly to matters of antitrust, where it urges the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and Antitrust Division of the Federal Government Department of Justice to
review current legislation and laws in the states for possible anticompetitive effects.126
Furthermore, antitrust issues arise when one particular coalition of professionals gathers in order
to undermine a competing coalition’s ability to compete. In this case, the American Medical
Association and the assorted State medical societies/associations make up coalitions, though their
efforts may not reach the level of antitrust; or if they do, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine may
protect those actions. Regarding legislation, the FTC has had a hand in guiding state legislatures
away from passing anti-competitive laws.127 The “advocacy” function of the FTC may prove to be
exceedingly influential, and it has certainly taken up the call directed to it by the IOM. 128 The
remainder of this note will focus briefly on the FTC’s role in antitrust action, and move into
discussions of the Sherman Act generally, as well as the Noerr-Pennington and State Action
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Doctrines, which are the primary limitations to antitrust action, and finally a discussion regarding
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC,129 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court,
which bears on the issue.
1: The FTC
Regulatory restrictions on APRN scope of practice have drawn attention from the FTC’s
competition advocacy program.130 The FTC’s interest in the issue is drawn from the FTC Act itself,
which “prohibits ‘[u]nfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’ and
gives the FTC a mandate ‘to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations’ from engaging in such
prohibited methods, acts, and practices.131 In the health care arena, the FTC has “investigated
restrictions on the business practices of health care providers, scrutinized proposed mergers, and
brought enforcement actions against health care providers that have violated federal competition
law.”132 The Commission has been enhanced by congressional legislation, such that “[e]conomic
and policy research and competition advocacy thus are at the core of the FTC's statutory mission,
alongside the Commission's civil law enforcement responsibilities.”133
The result is an FTC that may influence and enforce policy. Substantial challenges exist to
enforcing competition through litigation, such that the FTC cannot always act as a litigious sword
in the hands of regulators, but must instead sometimes work more passively, through legislatures
and legislators, in order to promote competition policy at a formative level. The FTC’s role in this
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context has been discussed comprehensively elsewhere, and will not be further discussed at length
here.134
2: The Sherman Act §1, Generally
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal, and criminalizes contracts or conspiracies in
restraint of trade.135 A section one claimant must initially prove three elements: (1) an agreement
or conspiracy between at least two persons or distinct business entities; (2) to harm or restrain
competition; and (3) which actually injures competition.136 Opposition to expanding the scope of
APRNs’ practice seems like a deceptively simple, per se instance of restraint of trade by the AMA
and other medical societies, or state boards of medicine: (1) Physicians make up such societies or
boards, and are persons or distinct business entities within the meaning of the statute, and have
obviously agreed to work together in this regard.137 (2) Their agreement is to advocate for policies,
which work to the detriment of APRN competition with them. (3) This harms consumers, since
without the ability to practice to the extent of their scope, APRNs cannot offer their services, even
when those services match those of competing physicians. Antitrust may be unavailing in this
context, though, because of two doctrines: the State Action Doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine.
3: The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Briefly, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects the First Amendment Right of citizens,
including trade groups, to earnestly petition the government to adopt a particular course of action,
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“no matter how anticompetitive the action sought.”138 Its reach is sweeping, covering all three
branches of government, as well as administrative agencies.139 In Eastern Railroad Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight,140 the case from which the doctrine takes its name, “railroads were genuinely
lobbying the legislature for laws that would favor them at the expense of their competitors,” which
given the First Amendment right to petition and our common understanding of representative
government is a fairly intuitive right to afford protection.”141 United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington142 was a similarly intuitive case, extending Noerr immunity to petitions of the
Executive.143 Finally, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited144 extended NoerrPennington immunity to entities interacting with the courts and administrative agencies, but
applied the “sham” exception for the first time.145 The “sham” exception stands for the principle
that “when efforts to influence government action are considered ‘sham,’ the petition is stripped
of its immunity.”146 In other words, immunity is lost when advocacy efforts are an obvious charade,
not pursued in good faith, but rather pursued as a means to obfuscate otherwise prohibited
intentions.

a: The Sham Exception
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Observed in the light of the sham exception, physicians’ organizations’ efforts to petition
the legislature against APRN scope of practice are suspect. Assuming that physicians’ societies
and boards deserve the benefit of the doubt regarding their good faith belief that APRNs are
insufficiently trained or competent to practice independently, one might think that they are being
deliberately obtuse with regard to the objective research on APRN outcomes. However, the
Supreme Court has eviscerated the sham exception to the point that it is essentially worthless in
this context, even when Noerr-Pennington immunity stands to severely injure consumers.147
In a legislative context, sham as an exception to Noerr-Pennington is entirely useless, even
if it involves fraud or misrepresentation.148 Even if, hypothetically, interest groups petitioning
legislatures do so in bad faith, and use entirely false data to support their positions, NoerrPennington is an absolute shield against antitrust liability. There is simply no chance to pursue
antitrust litigation in this context, nor is this Note meant to propose changes to the doctrine.
Nonetheless, the sham exception remains robust in the context of litigation or
administrative processes.149 Unfortunately, how this may apply to the immediate matter is unclear.
The AMA and other such organizations are not bringing lawsuits against APRNs to enjoin their
practice; if they were, then the sham exception might apply. Instead, there are currently physicians
serving on state medical boards, whose recommendations as to what the practice of medicine is
become the law. As state appointees, those regulators are shielded by the state action doctrine, and
are thus immune from antitrust action… with a new exception, recently delineated, as shall be
discussed infra.
3: The State Action Doctrine
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The State Action Doctrine, in the antitrust context, reinforces the principles of federalism
immunizing state action from antitrust challenge. Thus, a state agency may theoretically engage
in anticompetitive behavior without the risk of antitrust action, though it should be noted that “a
state cannot ‘give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.’”150
The state agencies of concern to this Note are Boards of Medicine, which define the
scope of the practice of medicine for a state.151 Board membership typically consists of
volunteers, ordinarily appointed by the governor, most of whom are usually physicians, though
several non-physicians often serve as well.152 In New Jersey, for example, the enabling statute
gives the governor appointment rights of the Board of Medical Examiners (as it is called in NJ),
and outlines all of the responsibilities of the Board; in particular, the Board decides the scope of
practice of medicine, and enforces that scope through the Attorney General.153 The statute
specifically states that the “Governor shall give due consideration to, but shall not be bound by,
recommendations submitted by the appropriate professional organizations of this State.”154 In
other words, professional (private) organizations have a voice in gubernatorial appointments to
the boards. While it makes sense that the governor has advice regarding who the best candidate
shall be for the position, it still raises some flags when a professional organization has a voice in
who gets to compete with it. Regardless, although prudent policy may call this a conflict of
interests, the state action doctrine renders it immune to judicial scrutiny. However, Justice
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Kennedy’s opinion in N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC recently made it a bit harder
for state boards to engage in anti-competitive behavior.155
4: N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC
The pertinent facts of the case arose when the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners
took upon itself to investigate, and then independently issue cease and desist orders to nondentists engaging in the commercial business of teeth-whitening, which the Board considered to
be the practice of dentistry.156 As Justice Kennedy later observed, while North Carolina had
delegated control to the Board over the practice of dentistry, the relatively new practice of teeth
whitening was not included in the empowering act as “the practice of dentistry.”157 The FTC
charged the Board of “violating 15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC Act, by excluding non-dentist teeth
whiteners from the market” in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.158 The Board petitioned the 4th
Circuit for review, seeking application of the state action doctrine.159
a: The 4th Circuit Decision
First, the 4th Circuit upheld the earlier determination by the FTC, that as a “public/private
hybrid entit[y]” the Board lacked government supervision, and was therefore a private actor.160
In concluding that the Board was not exempt under state action, the Fourth Circuit looked
specifically at the “Parker Doctrine,” which enumerates three situations under which an entity
can claim immunity.161 The Board had claimed immunity under the second Parker situation—the
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Midcal test—wherein “private parties can claim the Parker exemption if acting pursuant to a
‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’ and their behavior is ‘actively
supervised by the State itself.’”[sic]162 Recognizing that “fundamental national values of free
enterprise and economic competition [] are embodied in the federal antitrust laws,” the Court
sanctioned state-action immunity “only when [] clear that the challenged anticompetitive conduct
[was] undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that [was] the State's own.”163
The Court went on to determine that the regulatory scheme in question failed the Midcal
test, since the Board could not show that it was actively supervised by the State.164 According to
the 4th Circuit, the Board lacked supervision because its membership was elected exclusively by
private actors—that is, only other dentists elected the Board, with no involvement of the
Governor, nor any other elected official.165 This was sufficient for the FTC—and subsequently
the Fourth Circuit—to hold that the board was a private entity, even though it was created
through an act of the State. However, while the concurring gloss from the 4th Circuit stressed that
the ruling was narrow, and that had the Board been chosen by elected officials, Midcal would
have been satisfied, the Supreme Court’s recent decision has broadened the ruling remarkably.166

b: The Supreme Court’s Decision
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In affirming the 4th Circuit, Justice Kennedy stressed that, in order to gain Parker
immunity, it is necessary that a state agency prove “more than a mere façade of state
involvement”; specifically, that “[the] States accept political accountability for anticompetitive
conduct they permit and control.”167 The Court recognized that the private concerns of active
market participants, when those participants serve on state agencies, pose a danger to consumers
if private actors work to further their own interests, rather than those of the state.168 Therefore,
the government must seek assurance that those private actors are in fact pursuing the state’s
interests in addition to their own.169 The Court went on to hold that state boards controlled by
active participants in the market which the board regulates must satisfy the active market
participation test of Midcal in order to enjoy Parker immunity.
The Court introduced a test for “active supervision” that would satisfy Midcal.170 As a
general proposition, such an inquiry is “flexible and context-dependent.”171 Supervision “need
not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s operations,” but must probe “whether the
State’s review mechanisms provide ‘realistic assurance’ that a nonsovereign actor’s
anticompetitive conduct ‘promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual
interests.’”172 The Court identified four specific requirements of state supervision: first, the state
supervisor must review the substance of an anticompetitive board decision, not simply whether it
was procedurally proper; second, the supervisor must have veto power over, and power to
modify, the decision; third, the supervisor must be an active participant in the decision, rather
than simply having the potential to intervene; fourth, the supervisor may not itself be an active
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market participant. 173 The Court then iterated that further analysis would rely upon context and
the specific circumstances of the case.174
i: Implications of Dental Examiners
While the Court’s decision in the case has not completely opened the door for APRNs to
unilaterally expand scope of practice, it has limited the ability of state boards to act in an anticompetitive manner without the mandate of the state. The Dental Board was charged by the FTC
when the Board unilaterally sought to enforce the Board’s own definition of the practice of
dentistry; a definition that was not statutorily enunciated because, as Justice Kennedy observed,
the statute did not include “teeth whitening” in the definition.175 The Board’s violation of
antitrust law was specifically their unsupervised action taken against competitors. If the Board
had written the cease and desist letters under proper supervision, then the FTC would have had
no case. Accordingly, state boards of medicine may not take such uncompetitive, unilateral
action with regard to those they judge to exceed the scope of practice. But if such action is
currently being taken, it is not immediately apparent.
The decision should force states to reexamine their current oversight of professional
boards. While states probably have sufficient process to cover the Court’s active supervision test
under their Administrative Procedure Acts, it is obvious, given the facts of Dental Examiners,
that there are some actions of state boards that may have otherwise been overlooked.176 In New
Jersey, for example, state boards are vested with investigative powers.177 While state licensing
boards must exercise these investigative powers through the attorney general, that process must
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be examined in light of the Dental Examiners test to ensure proper oversight.178 The New Jersey
Board of Medical Examiners certainly falls under the auspices of Dental Examiners, since the
Board is comprised of at least 16 MDs and/or DOs (Doctors of Osteopathy), all of who should be
considered active market participants.179 Furthermore, the Board is given the power to subpoena
witnesses to appear before the Board.180 It is not absurd to think that the Board could use this
power in an intimidating, anti-competitive manner, just as the North Carolina Dental Board used
cease and desist letters.
Ultimately, Dental Examiners calls for sufficient oversight of specific actions taken by
State Boards. I do not contend that it reaches those medical societies and advocates covered by
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, nor do I propose that it can erode legislation or regulations duly
enacted by elected state actors. The decision affects actions of Boards acting in an anticompetitive manner, when they have not been specifically empowered so to do. If the New
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners decided tomorrow to start sending letters to nurse
practitioners demanding that they cease and desist treating patients, even when they are doing so
under a state-approved collaboration scheme with a physician, then that would definitely fall
under the kind of behavior prohibited by Dental Examiners.
I do not think one could successfully argue that Dental Examiners affects scope of
practice statutes, since those are passed specifically by the legislature. Legislation of this kind is
necessarily exempt from federal antitrust action due to the state action doctrine. State Boards of
Medicine do not themselves create and pass scope of practice laws, and to the extent that they
regulate the practice of medicine, those regulations must pass scrutiny by the legislature, thus
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satisfying the active supervision requirement.181 Only if it could be shown that a state board had
such autonomy as to pass scope of practice regulations without meaningful review from the
legislature could Dental Examiners overturn such legislation.
Part V: Conclusion
The facts favoring the expansion of the scope of practice for Advanced Practice
Registered Nurses is compelling, and momentum is entirely in favor of expansion. The ball is in
the courts of the legislatures, however, and though change may occur incrementally, it continues
to roll in favor of expansion. Although Dental Examiners may prove a strong tool for antitrust
litigants against specific anti-competitive actions taken by state boards of medicine, it is limited
to those circumstances when boards actually take such action themselves, and should not affect
scope of practice legislation. Since Noerr-Pennington allows any sort of misrepresentation to be
made in support of the prospect that physicians only will be the gatekeepers to public health, the
legislatures should allow themselves to be guided not by the campaign contributions of
physicians’ organizations, but by the social contributions of the nurses and their advocates.
The ultimate point of Dental Examiners, and the point of scope of practice legislation, is
that legislatures, not private actors, should decide what is best for the public welfare. This is not
to say that legislators are themselves all experts in the fields of medicine or nursing. Legislators
are experts in the field of governing, and are entrusted with the just governance of the people,
and with their welfare. They are also accountable to those people, which is why they are so
entrusted. The Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines represent the recognition that
legislators must be free to govern as they see fit. I do not argue against that proposition, or those
doctrines. It is apparent that the decision of what the proper scope of practice for APRNs is lies
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in the hands of legislators, not physicians or nurses. I only argue that such a decision must be
properly informed by objective study and careful consideration, by the opinions of both
physicians and nurses, and by the concern for the overall health and welfare of state populations,
not by concern for the pocketbooks of physicians.
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